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Bley: Left In the Rain Without The Umbrella: How Doe V. Brown Universit

LEFT IN THE RAIN WITHOUT AN UMBRELLA: HOW DOE v. BROWN
UNIVERSITY LEAVES NONSTUDENTS UNSHELTERED BY FEDERAL
TITLE IX PROTECTIONS
EMILY S. BLEY*
“Rain does not fall on one roof alone.”1
I.

THE PERFECT STORM: AN INTRODUCTION TO TITLE IX

Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX) has been a
lightning rod for controversy since it first emerged decades ago as a means for
women to enter the world of college sports.2 The Act has significantly evolved
from its origins in the athletic realm; today, Title IX is arguably better known for
the protection it provides to sexual assault survivors than the equality it
establishes in university locker rooms.3 Though instances of sexual misconduct
are no more frequent in our contemporary society than at the time of Title IX’s
passage, the issue of sexual misconduct has certainly achieved greater visibility
in recent years.4 Public reports of alleged sexual harassment and the filing of
formal legal complaints against offenders, have been central topics of discussion

*
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1. Cameroonian proverb, WISE OLD SAYINGS, http://www.wiseoldsayings.com/rainquotes/ [https://perma.cc/89JP-JS9D] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
2. See Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer
Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 99 (2010) (explaining Title IX is best known
for role in expanding women’s sports at high school and collegiate levels).
3. See generally Know Your Rights: Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Under Title
IX, AM. ASS’N U. WOMEN, https://www.aauw.org/what-we-do/legal-resources/know-yourrights-on-campus/campus-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/A2HF-M6H5](last visited Oct. 4,
2018) (answering frequently asked questions about Title IX rights); Title IX, END RAPE ON
CAMPUS, http://endrapeoncampus.org/title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/Y3LJ-WVTQ] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018) (listing resources available to students under Title IX); Title IX, RAPE ABUSE AND
INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/articles/title-ix (last visited Oct. 4, 2018)
(explaining available enforcement mechanisms under Title IX); Title IX and Sexual Assault,
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/title-ix-and-sexualassault (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (describing student rights under Title IX after sexual assault
occurs).
4. See Ann Jones, Sexual Harassment Has Not Changed So Much Since the 1970s, THE
NATION (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/sexual-harassment-has-notchanged-so-much-since-the-1970s/ [https://perma.cc/EQK3-ZU4S] (detailing author’s own
experiences with sexual harassment throughout the 1960s and 70s, as well as multiple stories
of sexual misconduct affecting other women). Jones noted that during the recent #MeToo
movement, some commentators grossly underestimated the universality of sexual harassment
toward women in the past few decades. See id. In Jones’s words, “None of this is new, though
we tend to act as if it were . . . for instance, I heard three young women radio reporters explain
that women back in the 1970s or 1980s accepted ‘unwanted male attention’ in the office and in
life ‘because that’s just the way things were.’” See id.
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in current news and pop culture.5 Society has increasingly scrutinized colleges
and universities, in particular, to pursue sexual assault allegations with focused
consistency and increased aggression.6 Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the
burgeoning #MeToo movement and the looming threat of more relaxed federal
guidance by the current administration, the future of Title IX is conflicted and
uncertain.7 Despite the political rhetoric swirling around its fate, Title IX has
long been hailed as an instrument of gender equality and a pillar of justice for
assault survivors.8 Yet most Americans may be surprised to know that Title IX’s
protections are curiously restrictive for such a liberally-construed statute.9
Under federal guidelines mandated by Title IX, an educational institution
that receives government funding is required to investigate, adjudicate, and report

5. See Slate Staff, The Best of the Reckoning, SLATE (Dec. 21, 2017, 4:12 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2017/12/the_best_writing_on_sexual_harass
ment_this_year.html [https://perma.cc/6G7A-RXEV] (archiving and praising many articles
written about sexual misconduct claims and formal legal complaints in 2017).
6. See RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS DEAR
COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011) (instructing every college that receives federal money to
comply with more aggressive Title IX standards: to use the lowest possible standard of proof—
preponderance of the evidence—in sexual assault causes, in addition to allowing accusers to
appeal not-guilty findings, accelerate their adjudication processes, and strongly discouraged the
cross-examination of accusers); see also KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, The Path to Obama’s
‘Dear
Colleague’
Letter,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/31/the-path-toobamas-dear-colleague-letter/?utm_term=.978f289cbffb
[https://perma.cc/Y6LL-2F6J]
(discussing political motivations and origins of Department of Education’s new federal mandate
in 2011).
7.
See History & Vision, ME TOO., https://metoomvmt.org/about/#history
[https://perma.cc/H4XQ-SJQF] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) (“The ‘me too.’ movement was
founded in 2006 to help survivors of sexual violence, particularly . . . young women of color
from low wealth communities, find pathways to healing . . . . In less than six months, because
of the viral #metoo hashtag, a vital conversation about sexual violence has been thrust into the
national dialogue.”); see also Emily Yoffe, Reining in the Excesses of Title IX, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept.
4,
2018),
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/title-ix-reforms-areoverdue/569215/ [https://perma.cc/J2GP-UHY7] (explaining current Secretary of Education
Betsy DeVos is on verge of announcing new Title IX guidelines, which would narrow definition
of sexual misconduct, and lower school officials’ expected knowledge and awareness of sexual
misconduct on campuses).
8. See Valerie Jarrett, 40th Anniversary of Title IX, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 21, 2012,
6:36 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/06/21/40th-anniversary-title-ix
[https://perma.cc/WH6R-N6FZ] (“Title IX matters. And it is just as important today as when
it was first passed forty years ago. Title IX bans sex discrimination against girls-and boys-in
all programs at schools around the country. From addressing inequality in math and science
education, to ensuring dormitories are safe, to preventing sexual assault on campus, to fairly
funding athletic programs, Title IX ensures equality for our young people in every aspect of
their education.”).
9. See Walker, supra note 2, at 110 (“Although Davis was technically a victory for sexual
assault survivors . . . Title IX advocates feared that the Supreme Court had established an
impossibly high bar for recovery. The doctrinal test of cases involving allegations of rape or
sexual assault on college campuses now has four components . . . .”). See, e.g., Doe v. Brown
Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D.R.I. 2017) (limiting private Title IX remedies to students
and employees at offending institution, only), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018). For a
discussion of the current elements required by federal law necessary to successfully claim a
Title IX violation see infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text.
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instances of gender-based discrimination and sexual violence.10 Essentially, a
publicly-funded school has a statutory duty under Title IX to ensure that
educational opportunities remain untainted by sexual misconduct.11 Should a
school fail to meet the requisite outlined standards for managing Title IX claims,
it not only risks financial punishment by the federal government, but also exposes
itself to a private right of action by the injured person.12
The educational institutions in the United States that receive federal funding
under Title IX, especially colleges and universities, often serve a community far
beyond the students enrolled in their classes and living on their campuses.13
These schools not only provide educational opportunities for their own students,
but they also host a variety of sporting events, artistic performances, speaking
engagements, and traditional celebrations for nonstudents.14 In addition to a
10. See Scope of Title IX, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/N6FE-GD47] (last
modified Sept. 25, 2018) (discussing the scope of Title IX and sex discrimination). The
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has stated:
Title IX applies to institutions that receive federal financial assistance from [the
Department of Education], including state and local educational agencies. These
agencies include approximately 16,500 local school districts, 7,000 postsecondary
institutions, as well as charter schools, for-profit schools, libraries, and museums.
Also included are vocational rehabilitation agencies and education agencies of 50
states, the District of Columbia, and territories and possessions of the United States.
Id.
11. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018) (imposing duty on publicly-funded institutions to
protect program participants from sexual discrimination); see also Annette Thacker, Helping
Students Who Can’t Help Themselves: Special Education and the Deliberate Indifference
Standard for Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment, 2011 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 701, 701–02 (2011)
(discussing how Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX as duty on part of educational
institutions to ensure student’s opportunity to receive an education is not hindered by unwanted
sexual misconduct).
12. See Walker, supra note 2, at 102, 105–06 (discussing recognition of not only
administrative enforcement mechanisms under Title IX, but also implied private right of action).
13.
See, e.g., Library Use Policy, FALVEY MEMORIAL LIBRARY,
https://library.villanova.edu/using-the-library/access/library-use-policy
[https://perma.cc/8CF9-BB7X] (last visited May 4, 2019) (“Visitors not affiliated with
Villanova University may use the Library during visitor hours of Monday-Friday, 9 a.m. – 5
p.m., and will be asked to register at the main library entrance desk and present a photo
identification card.”); Service and Social Justice, VILLANOVA U. MISSION & MINISTRY,
https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/mission/campusministry/service.html
[https://perma.cc/G76X-RDBA] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (providing various links for
student opportunities to advocate and volunteer, get involved in local Philadelphia community,
and participate in service and social justice); Nova Bucks Accepted Here, VILLANOVA U. UNIT,
https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/unit/wildcard/accepted.html [https://perma.cc/BV4EWPSP] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (listing convenience stores, restaurants, grocery stores,
salons, and other private establishments that solicit local business from Villanova students via
internal currency system operated by Villanova University).
14. See Blake Gumprecht, The American College Town, 93 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 51,
59–61 (2003) (noting most colleges and universities offer programming that appeals to students
and also surrounding community members and visitors from around country and world).
Gumprecht noted that the typical American college campus operates as a public space just as
much as it operates as a learning environment. See id. at 59. It is a distinctly American notion
that higher education should be a comprehensive experience that extends beyond the classroom.
See id. This outward-looking view of education in college and universities is what motivates
schools to “spend millions of dollars to maintain their campuses and provide a range of activities
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variety of public programming, these institutions offer tours and events for
enrolled students’ families, visiting students, alumni, and local residents.15 The
accessible and central nature of colleges and universities make them a magnet for
academic debate, community organization, and socialization.16 In fact, a single
limited geographic area, such as a college town or major U.S. city, may host
multiple educational institutions.17 The central and social nature of college
campuses make their boundaries as inexact as they are permeable.18 These
schools do not exist in quiet isolation, but are in constant flux; they are connected
by a common community as well as a continuous flow of visitors.19
Yet, while enrolled students may be able to take shelter under the umbrella
of protection provided by Title IX, that same canopy of security does not extend
to any innocent nonstudent who happens to pass through the same storm of
for students, staff, and people with no direct connection to the educational institution.” See id.
15. See id. at 69 (“On a half-dozen weekends every autumn, [Auburn, Alabama] is
transformed. Auburn’s football stadium holds 86,063 people, twice as many as live in the city.
Visitors who attend games spend an estimated $31.7 million annually.”); see also 2017 National
College Football Attendance Report, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (NCAA),
fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/football_records/Attendance/2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4USB-S6XX]
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (reporting that in 2017, Michigan State, Ohio State, Penn State, and
the University of Alabama had an average attendance of over 100,000 individuals at each home
football game).
16. See Gumprecht, supra note 14, at 59 (noting concept of publicly accessible college
campuses is American invention). When discussing the phenomena of the American campus
existing as a both a private and public space, Gumprecht commented:
In many ways the campus is the center of life in the college town, much as the central
business district was in the pre-automobile city or the shopping mall is in suburbia.
With their residential areas, restaurants and bookstores, recreational facilities,
concert halls, sports stadiums, landscaped grounds, and full calendars of events,
campuses often function like self-contained cities. They are centers of culture. They
are entertainment districts. They act as parks and historic sites. They have symbolic
and public relations importance. They are a hub of activities that serve not only
students and staff but also the larger population of the town and region. As such, the
campus serves both as an environment for learning and as a public space.
Id.
17.
See, e.g., Philadelphia, PA Colleges & Universities, AREAVIBES.COM,
https://www.areavibes.com/philadelphia-pa/colleges/ [https://perma.cc/AQA4-Z63C] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2018) (displaying map of all colleges and universities in Philadelphia urban
and suburban area, including twenty four-year institutions and eighteen more institutions that
grant junior degrees in various skills and vocations).
18. See supra notes 13–17 (demonstrating that college campuses are not only engaged
in community outreach with members of public and local communities, but also packed close
together in common geographic area, making campus boundaries less defined than perhaps
purported to be).
19. See Gumprecht, supra note 14, at 59–60 (discussing University of Oklahoma in
Norman, Oklahoma as a typical example of a U.S. higher educational institution spending and
investing significant capital to provide range of activities for students, staff, and those with no
direct connection to the school). Gumprecht further notes that the inclusion of certain facilities
in the very construction of modern colleges and universities is indicative of the multifaceted
role schools play in their respective communities. See id. at 59. The University of Oklahoma’s
campus is a prime example of an institution that serves both its students and the public; the
2,000-acre property features parks, an eighteen-hole golf course, a public swimming pool,
conference facilities, a hotel, an airport, as well as restaurants and bars. See id. The school also
owns two art museums, which feature rotating exhibits, and draws millions of people every year
to campus for sporting events. See id.
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assault, harassment, or discrimination.20 In a recent decision, the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that guests, visitors, and
prospective students who suffer on-campus sexual misconduct are not owed any
federal protections under Title IX.21 In other words, there is currently no private
remedy available under Title IX for nonstudents who are discriminated against,
harassed, or assaulted on college campuses by students of that school.22
Generally, the past few decades of federal case law regarding private rights
of action under Title IX indicate that the statute’s protection is limited to students
who attend the offending school.23 Before August 2017, only one case addressed
whether nonstudents have standing to bring a private Title IX action against a
college or university they do not attend.24 In K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College,25
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit effectively sidestepped
the question of nonstudent standing for Title IX claims.26 Instead, it dismissed
the suit by deciding that the nonstudent-plaintiff could not prove the requisite
elements of a Title IX claim.27
20. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D.R.I. 2017) (“The total absence
of a relationship between Ms. Doe’s educational institution (Providence College) and the
harassers’ school (Brown University) is dispositive on the issue of whether Ms. Doe has a Title
IX claim against Brown in this case. Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Doe has not alleged
that she was denied equal access to education as required for a Title IX claim to exist.”), aff’d,
896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).
21. See id. at 563 (“Finding that Ms. Doe’s status as a non-student, regardless of her
allegations that the Court accepts as true, removes her from Title IX’s private-cause-of-action
umbrella of protection, the Court need go no further in its analysis of that claim.”).
22. See id. at 562 (explaining Jane Doe was not student at Brown University and
therefore its actions, or the lack thereof, could not have prevented her from attaining education
in environment free of hostility or misconduct). As a result of the Doe decision, nonstudents
have no recourse under Title IX against a school that has failed to properly investigate,
adjudicate, or report an incident of sexual nature involving them, even if the incident happened
on their campus. See id. The District Court of Rhode Island further justified its holding by
explaining that the total absence of a relationship between Jane Doe and the programs and
services provided by Brown University cannot support claim of denial of equal access to
education, since Jane Doe had no access to Brown University in first instance. See id.
23. See generally Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
632 (1999) (involving student who sued school after suffering sexual harassment at the hands
of another student); Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 278–79 (1998)
(involving student who sued school after engaging in sexual relations with teacher, alleging that
she was harassed in violation of Title IX); Roe v. Saint Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 878–80 (8th
Cir. 2014) (involving college student who sued university after sexual assaulted by fraternity
member); Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 70–72 (1st Cir. 2007) (involving student
who sued school after experiencing sexually inappropriate behavior by another student); Frazier
v. Fairhaven, 276 F.3d 52, 65 (1st Cir. 2002) (involving student who sued school after harassed
in bathroom).
24. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The parties
dispute whether K.T.’s status as a non-student precludes her from asserting a Title IX
harassment claim.”).
25. 865 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017).
26. See id. at 1057 (finding K.T.’s suit had no merit because complaint failed to state
plausible claim regarding proving deliberate indifference and actual knowledge on behalf of
school administrators necessary in order to survive dismissal).
27. See id. at 1058 (“Thus, while K.T. was dissatisfied with Culver-Stockton’s response,
based on the allegations in the complaint the response cannot be characterized as deliberate
indifference that caused the assault.” (alteration in original)).
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Only a month later in Doe v. Brown University,28 the District Court of Rhode
Island contemplated the same question the Eighth Circuit declined to answer:
whether nonstudents may bring a Title IX claim against a college or university
they do not attend.29 The court, looking to the legislative history and statutory
language of Title IX, ultimately issued a blanket denial to all nonstudents seeking
Title IX claims against schools they do not attend.30 In doing so, the court closed
a legal door the Eighth Circuit had left open for nonstudents.31 Under the ruling
in K.T., if a nonstudent could demonstrate the requisite elements of a Title IX
claim, then regardless of enrollment status, that nonstudent could potentially
recover.32 Under the District Court of Rhode Island’s holding in Doe, if
nonstudents are assaulted on a college campus, they are absolutely barred from
bringing a Title IX claim against the offending school, regardless of the merits of
the claim.33
28. 270 F. Supp. 3d 556 (D.R.I. 2017), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).
29. See id. at 560 (explaining that Jane Doe must prove most basic criteria of Title IX
claim: that she is member of class of persons entitled to Title IX protection).
30. See id. at 561 (explaining that statutory language and legislative history of Act shows
that enforcing Title IX against educational institution was meant to be program specific, mostly
evidenced by fact that financial penalties were applied to specific program where violation
occurred); accord Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127, 133 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower
court’s decision to preclude Jane Doe from Title IX recovery because she did not participate in
Brown University’s educational programs). Although the First Circuit affirmed the District
Court of Rhode Island’s ruling in Doe, a footnote in its opinion sets forth an important caveat
to its decision:
We clarify, though, that a victim does not need to be an enrolled student at the
offending institution in order for a Title IX private right of action to exist. Members
of the public regularly avail themselves of the services provided by educational
institutions receiving federal funding. For example, they regularly access university
libraries, computer labs, and vocational resources and attend campus tours, public
lectures, sporting events, and other activities at covered institutions. In any of those
instances, the members of the public are either taking part or trying to take part of a
funding recipient institution’s educational program or activity. In the case before us,
however, Doe failed to allege that she had availed herself of any of Brown
University’s educational programs in the past or that she intended to do so in the
future. She did not plead that Brown University’s alleged deliberate indifference to
it prevented her from accessing such resources at Brown.
Id. at 132, n.6. This pronouncement by the First Circuit alters the district court’s blanket
preclusion of recovery for nonstudents under Title IX by focusing on the degree of participation
in the institution’s educational programs, rather than the enrollment status of the plaintiff. See
id.
31. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (agreeing with Eastern District Court of Missouri’s
previous reasoning in K.T., where it held that nonstudents do not suffer systemic effect on
educational programs or activities at school that they do not attend). For a further discussion
regarding the implications of the Doe decision, and how the Eighth Circuit’s silence on
nonstudent standing differs from the blanket denial of nonstudent standing see infra notes 160–
79 and accompanying text.
32. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[K.T.’s]
complaint identified no causal nexus between Culver-Stockton’s inaction and K.T.’s
experiencing sexual harassment . . . . [t]he complaint does not, however, allege that CulverStockton’s purported indifference ‘subject[ed] [K.T.] to harassment.’” (quoting Davis ex rel.
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999))).
33. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (holding that because Jane Doe was not enrolled at
Brown University, she cannot properly allege she was denied equal access to receiving
education there, as required for Title IX claim to stand).
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This Note analyzes the District Court of Rhode Island’s recent decision in
Doe to categorically exclude nonstudents from the class of persons able to bring
Title IX claims against educational institutions.34 This Note will further advocate
for courts to abandon the rules established in Doe in favor of a less-restrictive
application of Title IX, because the implications of the Doe decision are not only
inconsistent with the overall purpose of Title IX, but also jeopardize the health
and safety of students and the greater college community.35 Part II provides
information regarding the judicial expansion of Title IX over the past forty
years.36 Part III provides the facts and procedure of Doe.37 Part IV discusses the
court’s reasoning in deciding Doe.38 Part V critically evaluates the flaws in the
Doe decision and advocates for the adoption of a less-restrictive application of
Title IX for nonstudents.39 Finally, this Note concludes in Part VI, which
discusses the impact of the Doe.40
II. LIGHTNING STRIKES AND THUNDER FOLLOWS: THE ORIGINS OF TITLE IX
Though Title IX has long been at the center of the gender equality movement
in collegiate athletics, its modern emergence as a vehicle of protection for sexual
assault survivors is rooted in decades of judicial expansion.41 In particular, the
Supreme Court of the United States' formal establishment of the peer-harassment
doctrine signified a seismic shift in the application of Title IX on college
campuses.42 Now nonstudents are invoking the historically broad nature of Title
IX’s past judicial interpretation to widen the scope of recovery.43

34. See id. at 558 (finding expansion Jane Doe advocated for in class of persons able to
bring private Title IX claims is not permitted under Title IX or in past cases interpreting
language of statute).
35. For a complete argument advocating for the abandonment of the absolute exclusion
of nonstudents from bringing Title IX claims in Doe, see infra notes 160–79 and accompanying
text.
36. For a further discussion of the judicial history of Title IX, see infra notes 41–101 and
accompanying text.
37. For a further discussion of the facts of Doe, see infra notes 102–18 and
accompanying text.
38. For an analysis of the court’s reasoning and decision in Doe, see infra notes 119–38
and accompanying text.
39. For a complete critical analysis of the decision in Doe in light of the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in K.T., see infra notes 139–79 and accompanying text.
40. For a complete critical analysis of the decision in Doe in light of the Eighth Circuit’s
dec
ision in K.T., see infra notes 139–79 and accompanying text.
41. See Walker, supra note 2, at 99 (explaining evolution of Title IX from gender equality
statute for college sports to complex mechanism of protection for sexual assault survivors).
42. See infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the peer-harassment
doctrine from Davis and the introduction of the deliberate indifference standard.
43. See generally Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D.R.I. 2017) (holding
that nonstudent does not have standing under Title IX to bring peer harassment claim), aff’d,
896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018); K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir.
2017) (involving nonstudent-plaintiff seeking to bring peer-harassment claim under Title IX).
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A. Clouds on the Horizon: The Evolution of Title IX
Title IX has undergone extensive change in the realm of gender equality
since its inception in the 1970s.44 Title IX provides that, “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”45 Although
athletics are not explicitly mentioned in its statutory language, the unspoken
implications of Title IX required schools to offer equal opportunities for women
to play sports, as well as provide women with the same athletic facilities and
funds as men.46 The passage of Title IX, according to the legislators who drafted
and advocated for the Act, directly targeted several kinds of discrimination that
plagued educational institutions across the country.47 Though the use of Title IX
to achieve equality for women’s collegiate athletics was groundbreaking, the
untapped transformative potential of Title IX took decades to come into
realization.48
Congress originally devised Title IX as a means of achieving institutional
compliance through a monetary-based incentive system.49
Within the
44. See Walker, supra note 2, at 99 (“The focus on sports has limited the transformative
power of Title IX’s non-discrimination mandate. Not every woman plays sports, but a rapetolerant campus—with ineffective prevention programming, inadequate support services for
survivors, and inequitable grievance procedures—threatens every student.”).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
46. Christine Hepler, A Bibliography of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2013) (“Prior to the passage of Title IX, 170,000 men
participated in intercollegiate athletics. During the same time, only 30,000 women were
involved in intercollegiate athletics. By the Thirtieth Anniversary of the passage of Title IX,
209,000 men and 151,000 women participated in athletics at the college level.”).
47. See 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh) (“We are dealing with
discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies
within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment within an
institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever.”); see also Hepler, supra note 46, at 447–48
(noting that aside from Senator Bayh, who was most prominent proponent of gender equality
under Title IX in Senate, Title IX was supported by two female Democratic representatives in
House: Edith Green from Oregon and Patsy Mink from Hawaii).
48. See Hepler, supra note 46, at 442–45 (detailing general pre-enactment history of
Title IX and statistical evidence of improvements to gender equality in undergraduate athletic
programs).
49. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix [INSERT PERMALINK HERE] (last modified Aug. 6,
2015) (outlining procedures for terminating federal funding if program found noncompliant
with Title IX). The Title IX Legal Manual states:
Agency staff should remember that the primary means of enforcing compliance with
Title IX is through voluntary agreements with the recipients, and that fund
suspension or termination is a means of last resort. . . . Several procedural
requirements must be satisfied before an agency may deny or terminate federal funds
to an applicant/recipient. A four step process is involved: 1) the agency must notify
the recipient that it is not in compliance with the statute and that voluntary
compliance cannot be achieved; 2) after an opportunity for a hearing on the record,
the “responsible Department official” must make an express finding of failure to
comply; 3) the head of the agency must approve the decision to suspend or terminate
funds; and 4) the head of the agency must file a report with the House and Senate
legislative committees having jurisdiction over the programs involved and wait 30
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Department of Education, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) retains primary
enforcement authority over Title IX claims.50 Either in response to student
complaints or on its own initiative, the OCR may conduct Title IX compliance
reviews at schools that receive federal funding.51 If the OCR determines a school
violated Title IX standards, then the OCR has the power to terminate that school’s
federal funding.52 Still, the resolution offered by the OCR for institutional
transgressions is limited to its administrative impact; in reality, it has little to no
effect on the students who suffered injury because of a school’s failure to
investigate, adjudicate, and report their assault.53 Just a few years after Congress
passed Title IX, the Supreme Court recognized the shortcomings in the OCR’s
ability to provide that effective relief and expanded the method of recovery

days before terminating funds. The report must provide the grounds for the decision
to deny or terminate the funds to the recipient or applicant.
Id.
50. See Walker, supra note 2, at 101–04 (describing OCR administrative method of
redress in response to Title IX claim). Though no official elemental process has been outlined
by OCR to issue a Title IX complaint, a summary of scholarly analysis of OCR guidelines has
produced the following standard:
The purpose of filing a complaint with OCR is to trigger an investigation into the
adequacy of a school’s response to peer sexual harassment. The critical inquiry in
OCR review is how quickly and effectively the school responded after receiving
actual or constructive notice of harassment that impairs a student’s access to
educational programs or activities . . . . An OCR complaint should demonstrate: (1)
impairment of access to educational opportunities, (2) actual or constructive notice,
and (3) the inadequacy of the school’s response . . . .
Id. at 102, 104. Along with investigating institutional compliance with Title IX, the
responsibility of the OCR is to issue periodic policy guidelines regarding adequate and
reasonable responses by colleges and universities to filed complaints. See id. at 102.
51. See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2018) (authorizes the Office of Civil Rights to oversee and
ensure all applications for federal financial by program or institution that operations compliant
with Title IX); see also OCR’s Enforcement of Title IX, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html
[https://perma.cc/WKY2NC36] (last modified Sept. 25, 2018) (“OCR evaluates, investigates, and resolves complaints
alleging sex discrimination. OCR also conducts proactive investigations, called compliance
reviews, to examine potential systemic violations based on sources of information other than
complaints.”).
52. See supra note 50 (outlining method of terminating federal funding of noncompliant
educational institutions); see also Walker, supra note 2, at 102 (explaining that while OCR has
power to terminate federal funding, ultimate goal of OCR review is voluntary compliance).
Walker pointed out that while OCR has the power to terminate federal financial assistance and
pressure schools into voluntary compliance, “lackluster administrative enforcement [in the
OCR] has often forced private litigants to seek vindication of their civil rights within a daunting
doctrinal framework.” See id. Walker explained that Title IX complaints and OCR inquiries
are theoretically supposed to be complementary modes of enforcement; schools should change
their Title IX procedures in response to OCR sanctions, and then individuals should seek
personal remedy for the wrongs suffered as a result of the discriminatory practices of those
schools. See id. Unfortunately, as Walker discusses, there has been an increased reliance by
Title IX claimants on private civil suits because of disorganization and uncertainty at OCR. See
id.
53. See Walker, supra note 2, at 102 (discussing how shortcomings with OCR
enforcement, including recent pronounced inconsistencies in policy guidance, underscore
importance of bringing private suits); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 704–06
(1979) (noting that administrative remedy serves limited government policy ends and offers
virtually no substantial redress to individuals impacted by failed compliance with Title IX).
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available under the Act.54
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,55 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that an implied private right of action against an educational
institution exists under Title IX.56 The Court allowed personal recovery under
Title IX and reasoned that the right to bring an individual claim was consistent
with the legislative intent of the Act.57 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
identified two underlying principles upon which Title IX was founded.58 First,
the government should avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices; second, it should protect individual citizens against
those very practices.59 Though the administrative remedy already in place before
54. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705–06 (pointing out that standards for making formal
complaint with OCR are extraordinarily burdensome on individual litigants). Writing for the
Court, Justice Stevens shrewdly noted that a purely administrative remedy was misaligned with
the interests of complaining parties:
[I]t makes little sense to impose on an individual, whose only interest is in obtaining
a benefit for herself . . . the burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices are
so pervasively discriminatory that a complete cut-off of federal funding is
appropriate. The award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted
her own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with—and in some cases
even necessary to—the orderly enforcement of the statute.
Id.
55. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
56. See id. at 717 (holding that woman who was denied admission to the University of
Chicago could sue individually under implied Title IX remedy). Only several years after the
initial passage of Title IX, the Supreme Court in Cannon faced a relatively limited analytical
framework and took note of only two factors before expanding the remedy under Title IX: “Only
two facts alleged in the complaints are relevant to our decision. First, petitioner was excluded
from participation in the respondents’ medical education programs because of her sex. Second,
these education programs were receiving federal financial assistance at the time of her
exclusion.” Id. at 680.
57. See id. at 703 (“[W]hen that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the
accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its implication
under the statute.”); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)
(allowing monetary relief in private Title IX suits after acknowledging prospective relief and
administrative action would leave some plaintiffs without adequate remedy).
58. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703–04 (noting that both purposes were repeatedly
identified in debates over enactment of Title IX). As to the first purpose of keeping federal
funds away from discriminatory institutions, Hawaii Representative Patsy Mink stated:
Any college or university which has [a] . . . policy which discriminates against
women applicants . . . is free to do so under [Title IX] but such institutions should
not be asking the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination.
Millions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that
these funds should be used for the support of institutions to which we are denied
equal access.
117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971) (statement of Rep. Mink). As to the second purpose, of
protecting individuals from discriminatory practices, Senator Bayh stated: “[Title IX] is a strong
and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to provide women with solid
legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers . . . .” 118 CONG. REC.
5806–5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
59. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704, n.36 (deducing two alleged purposes behind passage
of Title IX based on arguments offered in support of Act during its drafting and debate in 1971
and 1972). In determining the two purposes behind the passage of Title IX, the Court
specifically quoted statements made by Representative Mink and Senator Bayh in the debates
surrounding the passage of Title IX. See supra note 58 (Congressional statements used by the
Court in Cannon).
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the Cannon decision served the first purpose, there were no appropriate means of
accomplishing the second purpose at that time.60 An implied right of action, the
Court reasoned, was necessary to accomplish the purpose of the statute: to
federally mandate the protection of individuals from discrimination.61 Therefore,
the Court held that Title IX could be used implicitly as a statutory vehicle for
individual relief.62
For many years, the primary parties involved in private Title IX actions were
students bringing claims against universities.63 The Supreme Court, however,
expanded the class of individuals able to seek relief under Title IX in North Haven
Board of Education v. Bell.64 According to the Court, both the legislative and
postenactment history of Title IX supported the inclusion of employees in the
class of people entitled to protection under Title IX.65 To give Title IX the wide
60. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704–06 (discussing deficiencies of administrative redress
to provide adequate justice for students injured by an educational institution’s failure to comply
with Title IX). According to the Court, the first purpose of Title IX—to avoid the use of federal
resources to support sexually-biased institutions—was already served by “the statutory
procedure for the termination of federal financial support for institutions engaged in
discriminatory practices.” See id. at 704. The Court acknowledged that this remedy is a
particularly severe sanction for an educational institution, but it does not provide an appropriate
means of accomplishing the second purpose, which is to protect individuals from noncompliant
institutions. See id. at 705.
61. See id. at 699–703 (reasoning that striking parallels between Title VI and Title IX
support the creation of a private right of action under Title IX). The Court noted that when Title
IX was enacted, Title VI had already been construed several times as creating a private
remedy. See id. at 696. For Title VI suits, no express cause of action was available under its
statutory language, but private suits moved forward anyway. See id. at 700. When evaluating
the relationship between Title IX and Title IV the Court noted, “Except for the substitution of
the word ‘sex’ in Title IX to replace the words ‘race, color, or national origin’ in Title VI, the
two statutes use identical language to describe the benefitted class.” Id. at 694–95. In the
Court’s view, the similar language used in Title VI and Title IX supported the conclusion that
Congress intended to create statutes with similar goals of protection, similar modes of
enforcement, and similar methods of recovery. See id. at 696–98. Since an implied right of
action already existed under Title VI, an anti-discriminatory statute, the Court held that the
second purpose of Title IX—protecting individuals from discrimination—would also served by
“the award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted her own suit is not only
sensible but is also fully consistent with—and in some cases even necessary to—the orderly
enforcement of that statute.” See id. at 705–06.
62. See id. at 709 (“Not only the words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter
and underlying purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of private victims of
discrimination.”).
63. See generally N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535–36 (1982)
(introducing school employees to existing class of persons deserving protection under Title IX).
The Supreme Court held that a female employee of a school district who complained of gender
discrimination had a cause of action under Title IX. See id. at 540.
64. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
65. See id. at 535–36 (borrowing same method of reasoning used in Cannon, the Court
reviewed Congressional Record and determined that weight of legislative history as well as
postenactment developments, are important authority to consider when interpreting scope of
Title IX). As an example of how Title IX has been construed broadly in the past, the Court
recounted U.S. Senator James McClure’s attempt to introduce an amendment to Title IX that
would have restricted the term “educational program or activity” to include only curriculum or
graduation requirements of the relevant institution. See id. at 535. The Amendment failed after
opposition from Senator Bayh, who claimed “it would exempt those areas of traditional
discrimination against women that are the reason for the Congressional enactment of Title IX.”

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2020], Art. 1

12

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

[Vol. 64: p. 1

scope of protection Congress intended, the Court construed the Act’s written form
generously.66 In doing so, the Court paid special attention to the language
Congress selected in Title IX, particularly to the use of the word “person” rather
than the selection of a more limited word, such as “student.”67 Title IX’s broad
directive that no “person” should be subject to gender discrimination ultimately
supported the conclusion that employees also should not suffer any exclusion or
denial of benefits on the basis of sex.68
B. Changes in Air Pressure: The Supreme Court Establishes the Davis
Standard
The Court issued its last major expansion of recovery under Title IX in Davis
ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education.69 In its most liberal
ruling on Title IX yet, the Supreme Court held that a person may pursue a private
cause of action against a school receiving federal funds in the case of student-onstudent, or peer, sexual harassment.70 That is, an educational institution need not
be the direct perpetrator of the discrimination or harassment at issue in order to
be held privately liable for the harm done to one of its students; it is enough if the
school knew about the hostile circumstances and did nothing to address them.71
Id. (internal citations omitted).
66. See id. at 521–22 (noting that Title IX lists exclusion of classes by specific schools,
such as certain religious and military institutions, and that absence of a specific class exclusion
for “employees” in this section supported conclusion that Title IX’s broad protection of
“persons” extends beyond students to include employees).
67. See id. at 521 (surmising that Congress’s use of the word “person” in Title IX
statutory language implies broad application of protection); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018)
(declaring that no person shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex by publicly
funded educational institution).
68. See id. (opining that broad language and purpose of Title IX implies generous
interpretation of word “person”). The Court noted that the Congressional selection of the
particular word “person” in lieu of other possible class categorizations was significant:
Because [Title IX] neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its
reach, we should interpret the provision as covering and protecting these “persons”
unless other considerations counsel to the contrary. After all, Congress easily could
have substituted “student” or “beneficiary” for the word “person” if it had wished to
restrict the scope of [Title IX].
Id.
69. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
70. See id. at 646–47 (holding that school’s failure to investigate, adjudicate, or report
known sexual harassment of young girl by a student created an abusive environment that
deprived her of educational benefits and opportunities protected under Title IX). The Davis
decision ultimately announced that a school is not only liable under Title IX for its own
misconduct, but also for the misconduct of one of its students when it fails to properly pursue
steps to remedy a known instance of student-on-student harassment. See id.
71. See id. (“We thus conclude that recipients of federal funding may be liable for
‘subject[ing]’ their students to discrimination where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to
known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the harasser is under the school’s
disciplinary authority.” (alteration in original)); see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist.,
524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (addressing whether school receiving federal funding was liable under
Title IX for harassment perpetrated teachers against student). Just a year prior to Davis, the
Court outlined a deliberate indifference test to determine whether an employee’s independent
sexual misconduct is attributable to the school district under Title IX. See id. In a decision
written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that two criteria must be met in order to succeed
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The three-prong test from Davis requires a plaintiff to first establish that the
sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
deprived the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.72 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the school had
actual knowledge of the sexual harassment.73 Finally, the plaintiff must show
that the school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.74 The Court offered
a comprehensive discussion regarding the definition of deliberate indifference
and its relation to the level of misconduct required to warrant a claim under Title
IX.75 According to Davis, not only must the school official have substantial
authority over the person, but the conduct in question must have occurred in
circumstances under considerable exposure to the official or the institution.76 The
Court defined the deliberate indifference standard as: “the recipient’s response to
the harassment or lack thereof [must be] clearly unreasonable in light of the
known circumstances.”77 Since the Davis decision, federal courts have
on a private Title IX claim. See id. at 290. First, the plaintiff must show that a school official
with the authority to correct the circumstances knew of the offensive conduct. See id. The
Court went on to clarify that an appropriate official is a person who works at the recipient entity
with the authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination. See id. Second, the party
must show that despite having such knowledge, the school failed to properly respond; or acted
with deliberate indifference. See id. at 291. The Court further noted that the deliberate
indifference standard is one that requires actual notice. See id. In sum, the Court defined the
deliberate indifference test and stated: “We conclude that damages may not be recovered . . .
unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective
measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the
teacher’s misconduct.” Id. at 277.
72. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (explaining requisite extent of the suffered harassment
needed in order to pursue a Title IX claim against an educational institution); see also Thacker,
supra note 11, at 711 (outlining prongs of test from Davis).
73. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (establishing actual notice as standard of knowledge for
school administrators).
74. See id. at 643 (reintroducing deliberate indifference standard first outlined by
Supreme Court as an appropriate standard for reviewing Title IX claims). For a further
discussion on the deliberate indifference standard, see infra notes 75–84 and accompanying
text.
75. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (justifying the high standard of requiring claimant to
prove that harassment was so serious as to have systemic effect of denying access to educational
program). The Court noted that because a school cannot realistically, or fairly, be held liable
for every independent act by each of its students, the standard for Title IX claims is considerably
high:
By limiting private damages actions to cases having a systemic effect on educational
programs or activities, we reconcile the general principle that Title IX prohibits
official indifference to known peer sexual harassment with the practical realities of
responding to student behavior, realities that Congress could not have meant to be
ignored.
Id.
76. See id. at 645 (limiting recipient school’s liability to circumstances where institution
exercises substantial control over both harasser and context in which known harassment occurs).
77. See id. at 648 (describing deliberate indifference standard); see also Gebser v. Lago
Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (explaining deliberate indifference and its
implications on enforcement of Title IX); Thacker, supra note 11, at 712–13 (“The phrase ‘not
clearly unreasonable’ is the prong where circuit courts, as well as district courts, have split.
Exactly what type of conduct ensures that a school district’s response to student-on-student
harassment is ‘not clearly unreasonable’ is still up for debate.”). The Court explicitly defined
deliberate indifference in Gebser as “an official decision by the recipient of public funding not
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consistently and universally applied the deliberate indifference standard.78
Before Davis, the Court had not considered claims involving peerharassment, and it depended heavily on external sources to justify its grant of
private claims for peer offenses.79 Just as in Cannon and Bell, the Court primarily
relied on past judicial interpretations of Title VII, as well as material dispersed
by the OCR regarding appropriate responses to peer-harassment.80 In doing so,
the Court broadened the scope of Title IX, and the Davis decision became known
as a victory for advocates of Title IX’s expansion.81 Still, though the decision
gave plaintiffs the power to hold educational institutions liable for failing to act

to remedy the [Title IX] violation” once that recipient has notice of the violation. See Gebser,
524 U.S. at 290.
78. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645 (“That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a minimum,
‘cause [students] to undergo’ harassment or ‘make them liable or vulnerable’ to it.” (alteration
in original)); see, e.g., Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 706-07 (4th Cir. 2018)
(stating Davis is the standard by which peer harassment claims are evaluated); K.T. v. CulverStockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiff had failed to meet
standard for peer harassment claim under Davis); Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 614 (noting
Davis must be met in order to impose liability on school for peer harassment claim) (7th Cir.
2014); Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2007) (outlining elements of
Davis test); Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding language
from Davis regarding “actual notice” was sufficient for jury instruction on Title IX claim);
Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This is our first
application of Davis to a student-student harassment case.”).
79. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 638–49 (discussing precedential decisions issued by Supreme
Court on Title IX, examining language of statute, and analyzing records of debates between
members of Congress over the proper interpretation of Title IX claims). In particular, the Davis
decision relied heavily on the holding in Gebser just a year prior. See id. at 643. The Court
specifically stated: “Gebser thus established that a recipient intentionally violates Title IX, and
is subject to a private damages action, where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known
acts of teacher-student discrimination.” Id. Applying this very same framework from Gebser,
the Supreme Court successfully created a test in Davis to determine whether the independent
conduct of a student is attributable to the school district. See id. In doing so, the Court expanded
the protective reach of Title IX by preventing recipients of federal funding from not only
engaging in discriminatory behavior, but also failing to stop discriminatory behavior. See id.
80. See id. at 636 (borrowing concepts and reasoning from Title VII jurisprudence). The
Court noted some similarities between Title VII and Title IX:
[A]s Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile working
environment
created
by
co-workers
and
tolerated
by
the
employer, Title IX encompasses
a
claim
for
damages
due
to
a sexually hostile educational
environment
created
by
a
fellow student or students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to
eliminate the harassment.
Id. (quoting Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (1996)).
The Court in Davis also cited a contemporary OCR handbook, which, in its official guidance,
advised educators to take immediate steps to investigate the claims and take steps to eliminate
a hostile environment. See id. at 648.
81. Compare Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 477 (D.N.H. 1997)
(“Accordingly, since the duty of a school to its students should correlate with that of an
employer to its employees, it makes sense to apply the knew-or-should-have-known standard
to the instant action.”), with Brodeur v. Claremont Sch. Dist., 626 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 (D.N.H.
2009) (outlining elements of Davis, including deliberate indifference standard and actual
knowledge requirement, as appropriate test for evaluating Title IX claim); see Thacker, supra
note 11, at 711 (explaining that Davis is dominating precedent for Title IX peer harassment
claims).
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on peer-harassment claims, the Davis test is a high burden to overcome.82 To
establish a viable Title IX claim, Davis requires the plaintiff to address three
elements that are incredibly difficult to prove: deliberate indifference, actual
knowledge, and severe, pervasive and objectively offensive harassment.83
Despite these setbacks, Davis stands today as the touchstone decision for
evaluating peer-harassment claims pursuant to Title IX.84
C. Eye of the Storm: K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College’s Silence on
Nonstudent Standing
Only one month before the District Court of Rhode Island issued its decision
in Doe, the Eighth Circuit delivered an opinion in a case with almost identical
facts: K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College.85 In K.T., Culver-Stockton College
invited a female nonstudent to visit the campus as a potential recruit for the
school’s women’s soccer team.86 While on campus, an enrolled student sexually
assaulted the nonstudent at a fraternity house party.87 According to the
nonstudent, she reported the assault to campus authorities the same weekend it
occurred, but the college failed to pursue any further action in response to the
82. See Heather D. Redmond, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: Scant
Protection for the Student Body, 18 LAW & INEQ. 393, 412 (2000) (“Although the ultimate
conclusion of the Court in Davis was correct, the standard is too narrow.”). Redmond argued
that the actual notice standard established in Davis is ineffective in a school setting because it
requires young, inexperienced, and ill-equipped students to make reports of peer harassment to
school officials, and effectively gives school officials permission to ignore student conduct until
that actual notice is received. See id. at 415. Instead, Redmond argued the Court should have
adopted a constructive notice standard, which is what several circuits utilized in Title IX cases
prior to the Davis decision, and is similar to the standard used in Title VII cases of sexual
harassment in the workplace. See id. at 413. Redmond also took issue with the deliberate
indifference standard established by Davis because it requires a school to show only that it was
not “clearly unreasonable” in its response to a Title IX claim. See id. at 415; see also Walker,
supra note 2, at 110 (pointing out that though Supreme Court had sided with survivor of sexual
harassment in creating peer-harassment doctrine, it also established impossibly high bar for
recovery).
83. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (establishing elements for evaluating peer harassment
Title IX claim); see also Thacker, supra note 11, at 711 (outlining prongs of test from Davis);
Walker, supra note 2, at 110–11 (discussing how elements of Davis have repeatedly frustrated
courts and plaintiffs); see, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 164, 174 (1st
Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (“[T]itle IX does not require
educational institutions to take heroic measures, to perform flawless investigations, to craft
perfect solutions, or to adopt strategies advocated by parents. The test is . . . whether the
institution’s response . . . is so deficient as to be clearly unreasonable.”); Bostic, 418 F.3d at 361
(holding notice of mere possibility of sexual harassment to proper official is not sufficient to
satisfy actual notice standard); P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 663 (8th Cir.
2001) (holding instance where principal was notified by teachers about possible inappropriate
behavior toward student was insufficient to constitute actual notice).
84. See Thacker, supra note 11, at 711 (noting that Davis is the most significant
precedent in peer-harassment and sexual assault claims).
85. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that
nonstudent who was sexually assaulted on college campus did not meet requisite elements
needed to succeed in a private right of action under Title IX).
86. See id. (noting means by which nonstudent arrived on college campus, where the
sexual misconduct took place).
87. See id. (detailing factual circumstances surrounding sexual misconduct).
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claim.88 The nonstudent then sued the college in federal court under Title IX.89
Culver-Stockton College replied to the complaint with a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the nonstudent-plaintiff failed to state a claim because she was not
an enrolled student at the time of the assault.90 The college contended that the
peer-harassment doctrine, as the name suggests, applies only in cases where
students sue their school over harassment by a fellow student.91 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri agreed, reasoning that
the implications of the nonstudent-plaintiff’s argument were inconsistent with the
appropriate standards for Title IX claims outlined in Davis.92 The decision noted
that the Supreme Court requires a degree of misconduct so extreme that it has a
systemic effect on educational programs or activities of the claimant—who
presumably has access to the programs and activities offered by the offending
school.93 The Eastern District of Missouri postulated that if any person invited
to a campus had standing to sue for peer-harassment under Title IX, it would
expand the scope of Title IX’s protection beyond the limit the Court outlined in
Davis.94 Therefore, the court chose to preclude nonstudents rather than, in its
view, expose hundreds of colleges and universities to an unprecedented degree
of liability.95
88. See id. (explaining that though incident was reported immediately, defendant college
did nothing other than cancel scheduled conference with K.T. and her parents).
89. See id. (noting K.T.’s claim was based on a peer-harassment theory first promulgated
in the Davis decision). The nonstudent-plaintiff brought a private Title IX action according to
the standard laid out in Davis: “Davis held that a federally funded institution may be liable for
damages in a private Title IX action if its deliberate indifference to known acts of peer
harassment denied the victim access to educational opportunities provided by the institution.”
Id. Specifically, the nonstudent-plaintiff claimed the college acted with deliberate indifference
by first failing to take reasonable preventative measures such as supervising her during her visit,
and second, by failing to investigate the claim and provide her with adequate treatment after she
reported the incident. See id.
90. See id. at 1056 (explaining procedural posture of case and parties’ respective
arguments).
91. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 4243965 at *5
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016) (holding at district court level that nonstudent was outside scope of
persons Congress intended Title IX to protect). In response to the plaintiff’s assertions, CulverStockton College responded that both the underlying purpose and overarching extent of Title
IX did not support the extension of protection to a nonstudent:
The College replies that the foundational underpinning of the Supreme Court’s
limited extension of liability for student-on-student harassment in Davis is the
remedial purpose embodied in Title IX of preventing on-going harassment of
students based on their gender. It argues there is a material difference between a
student who is enrolled, taking classes, and remains on campus with an alleged
harasser, and plaintiff, who alleges she only visited the campus for a day or two.
Id.
92. Id. at *6 (noting that Davis emphasized the requirement of a substantial effect on
access to educational opportunities and benefits of Title IX claimant, and recognizing that the
plaintiff’s basis for liability was based on a single event).
93. See id. (discussing the required elements under test from Davis); see also supra notes
69–84 and accompanying text for extensive analysis of Title IX standards promulgated by
Davis.
94. See K.T., 2016 WL 4243965 at *6 (“[A] non-student, subjected to a single instance
of harassment by a student, no matter how severe, cannot bring an action against the institution
because there is no systemic effect on [the non-student’s] educational programs or activities.”).
95. See id. (justifying preclusion of nonstudents under Title IX in lieu of opening
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit declined to address whether, as a threshold
requirement, a plaintiff must be a student in order to claim recovery under Title
IX.96 Instead, the court assumed arguendo that the plaintiff’s status as a
nonstudent did not preclude her from asserting a Title IX harassment claim, and
heard the complaint on its merits.97 The Eighth Circuit found that, because
Culver-Stockton College had no prior basis for anticipating the sexual assault, the
nonstudent-plaintiff failed to satisfy the deliberate indifference element of a Title
IX claim.98 The court also noted that although the nonstudent-plaintiff informed
the school of the assault immediately after it occurred, the actual knowledge
element requires the funding recipient to have prior notice of a substantial risk of
peer-harassment.99 Finally, the court remarked that a single grievance, no matter
how individually heinous, does not adequately assert the kind of severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive discrimination required under the Davis
standard for peer-harassment claims.100 Though the Eighth Circuit ultimately
floodgates). The Eastern District had no interest in shouldering a massive expansion of
collegiate liability, especially when no previous case law was on-point with the issue, and the
Supreme Court had been clear in its instructions in Davis: “Accepting [Plaintiff K.T.’s]
argument would impermissibly expand the law’s scope beyond the limited right of action
recognized by the Supreme Court [in Davis] that requires a ‘systemic effect on educational
programs or activities.’” See id. (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652–53 (1999)).
96. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017)
(acknowledging that both parties disputed whether the plaintiff’s nonstudent status precluded
her from asserting a Title IX claim). Though the Eighth Circuit identified the central issue as
whether the nonstudent had standing to bring suit, it assumed arguendo that enrollment status
was not a determinative factor to seek a private remedy under Title IX. See id. In choosing to
evaluate K.T.’s claim on its merits, the Eighth Circuit declined to affirmatively decide if
nonstudents could seek Title IX recovery via the Davis test, and left open the question of
standing for nonstudent-plaintiffs. See id. The implications of this judicial decision are
discussed further in notes infra 160–79 and accompanying text.
97. See K.T., 865 F.3d at 1057 (evaluating plaintiff’s private Title IX claim based on
elements outlined in Davis). The Eighth Circuit considered whether Culver-Stockton College
acted with deliberate indifference, whether Culver-Stockton College had actual knowledge of
the discrimination, and whether the nonstudent-plaintiff experienced severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive discrimination. See id.
98. See id. at 1058 (“At most, [K.T.’s] allegations link the College’s inaction with
emotional trauma K.T. claims she experienced following the assault. The complaint does not,
however, allege that Culver-Stockton’s purported indifference ‘subject[ed] [K.T.] to the
harassment.’”) (quoting Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999)
(alteration in the original)). In other words, the alleged deliberate indifference on the part of
the institution must cause the assault, and it is not sufficient if the deliberate indifference is a
mere reflection of the school’s after-the-fact response to the plaintiff’s complaint of the assault.
See id.
99. See id. at 1058–59 (explaining requisite standard to satisfy actual knowledge element
of private Title IX claim). The court noted that the plaintiff needed to provide more than a
single post-incident notice of her sexual assault in order to satisfy the actual knowledge element.
See id. In the Eighth Circuit, “actual knowledge may be established where the recipient has
prior knowledge of (1) harassment previously committed by the same perpetrator and/or (2)
previous reports of sexual harassment repeatedly occurring on the same premises.” Id. (citing
Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)). Because the
plaintiff’s complaint lacked any assertion that the college knew she faced a risk of sexual assault
or harassment on their campus during her visit, she did not fulfill the actual knowledge element.
See id.
100. See id. at 1059 (“Although we are sympathetic to K.T.’s circumstances and agree
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halted the nonstudent-plaintiff’s suit for the stated reasons, its refusal to
categorically preclude nonstudents from bringing suit axiomatically implied that
if nonstudent-plaintiffs satisfy the elements of a peer-harassment claim they may
bring a private claim under Title IX.101
III. WEATHER REPORT: THE FACTS OF DOE v. BROWN UNIVERSITY
In September 2017, the District Court of Rhode Island faced the very same
question the Eighth Circuit declined to address only a few weeks prior in K.T.:
whether nonstudents have standing to bring a private right of action under Title
IX against educational institutions.102 Jane Doe was a freshman student at
Providence College in Providence, Rhode Island.103 In November 2013, three
Brown University football players drugged Jane Doe at a bar in Providence before
taking her back to Brown University’s campus where they sexually assaulted
her.104 Several days after the incident, Jane Doe received medical treatment and
underwent laboratory tests at a Massachusetts hospital.105 She reported the
assault to both Providence Police and Brown University Police in February
2014.106
In the fall of 2014, after Jane Doe made several requests to the
administration, Brown University finally agreed to conduct an inquiry into her
that she has alleged opprobrious misconduct on the part of the fraternity member, K.T.’s
singular grievance on its own does not plausibly allege pervasive discrimination as required to
state a peer harassment claim.”). Notably, in its discussion of this element, the court did not
place significant emphasis on the fact that the discrimination must affect access to an
educational program or activity. See id. Rather, it highlighted the need for a plaintiff to prove
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive discrimination. See id. Additionally, the court
remarked that under the Davis standard, a singular grievance of harassment, on its own, is not
enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an education program
or activity, thereby implying that further evidence of the adverse effects suffered by a survivor
are necessary for a successful Title IX claim. See id.; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (noting
relationship between victim and harasser necessarily affects the extent to which the misconduct
can be said to breach Title IX standards). In other words, though student-on-student harassment
is actionable under Title IX, the Court in Davis stated that it is less likely to disrupt a student’s
educational benefits and systemically affect educational programs or activities than would
teacher-on-student misconduct as in Gebser. See id.
101. For a further discussion on the implications of the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in
K.T., see infra notes 160–79 and accompanying text.
102. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 561 (D.R.I. 2017) (“[C]an a
Providence College student who was sexually assaulted by a Brown student on Brown’s campus
bring a Title IX damages suit against Brown alleging deprivation of an educational opportunity
at Providence College?”), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).
103. See id. at 558 (stating Jane Doe’s enrollment at Providence College at time of
incident).
104. See id. (describing how Jane Doe was taken from bar by taxi back to Brown
University’s campus).
105. See id. (explaining lab tests later confirmed Jane Doe had common-date rape drug
in her system at time of incident).
106. See id. (recounting public safety and law enforcement agencies to which Jane Doe
reported incident of sexual assault). Providence Police executed search warrants for cell phones
and dorm rooms of suspects and found phone communications between football players
referencing rape, as well as explicit photographs of Jane Doe, which were taken during assault.
See id.
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allegations under the school’s disciplinary code, but not under federal Title IX
standards.107 Following Jane Doe’s repeated questioning regarding the results of
the investigation, Brown University eventually informed her in 2016 that it never
completed the internal inquiry concerning her assault and had abandoned any
disciplinary action against the students.108 Jane Doe ultimately withdrew from
Providence College, claiming that Brown’s failure to pursue disciplinary action
against its students allowed the students the freedom to roam the city of
Providence, including Providence College, and caused her to fear for her
safety.109
Jane Doe then sued Brown University and several of its administrators
alleging they failed to adequately protect her under Title IX and acted with
deliberate indifference by refusing to investigate or provide any other remedy for
her assault.110 She further claimed that because Brown University failed to
respond effectively to her complaint, the undisciplined attackers were allowed
free range of the local area, which in turn generated a hostile educational
environment at Providence College.111 Jane Doe alleged that this fear caused a
substantial interference with her educational opportunities and benefits,
ultimately causing her to withdraw.112
Jane Doe brought her Title IX claim in the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island.113 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c),
Brown University moved for judgment on the pleadings and argued that because
Jane Doe was not an enrolled student and did not receive any educational benefit
from Brown University, she was not entitled to the University’s protection under
Title IX.114 According to Brown University, the class of persons afforded Title
107. See id. at 558 (noting Brown University would not initially investigate Jane Doe’s
complaint until pressed, and did not investigate complaint pursuant to federal standards). Jane
Doe ultimately filed a complaint against Brown University with OCR because she believed
Brown University was required to address her complaint under Title IX, though the complaint
was pending at time of District Court’s ruling). Id. at 558, n.2.
108. See id. at 558 (describing Brown University’s failure to comply with Jane Doe’s
request that it completed its inquiry into the alleged incident).
109. See id. (explaining Jane Doe’s purported reasons for withdrawing from Providence
College).
110. See id. at 558–59 (naming Brown University; Jonah Allen Ward, Senior Associate
Dean of Student Life; and Yolanda Castillo-Appollonio, Associate Dean of Student Life, as codefendants in the suit).
111. See id. at 559 (explaining how Brown University’s alleged failure to comply with
Title IX adversely affected Jane Doe). Jane Doe, though not a student at Brown University,
attended Providence College, another institution of higher education located nearby. See id. As
a result of Brown University’s failure to respond to her complaint, Jane Doe alleged that she
suffered fear for her safety on her own school’s campus and in the general Providence area. See
id. Because the men from Brown University who assaulted her faced no disciplinary action by
their own institution, they were not prohibited from being near or contacting her. See id. As a
result of this fear, she allegedly suffered a “hostile education environment” at Providence
College, which substantially interfered with her access to educational opportunities or benefits.
See id.
112. See id. (describing reasoning behind Jane Doe’s allegations and subsequent
withdrawal from Providence College).
113. See id. (noting Jane Doe also claimed violations of Rhode Island Civil Rights Act
(RICRA) and Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution).
114. See id. at 559 (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings [under Rule 12(c)] is treated
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IX protection is limited to the students and staff of the offending school.115 Jane
Doe sought to expand this class and petitioned the District Court of Rhode Island
to widen the scope of the statute’s protection to include nonstudents.116
According to Jane Doe, the statutory language of Title IX reflects Congress’s
intent to protect all persons, regardless of their enrollment status, who come
within the school’s control.117 The court ultimately agreed with Brown
University; Jane Doe was not a student of the school and therefore did not fall
within Title IX’s private-cause-of-action umbrella of protection.118
IV. A CLOUD WITHOUT A SILVER LINING: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF DOE v.
BROWN UNIVERSITY
In support of its decision to preclude Jane Doe from the class of persons
entitled to individual recovery under Title IX, the District Court of Rhode Island
began its analysis by outlining the requisite elements of a Title IX claim set forth
in Davis.119 According to the court, the requisite elements assume at the outset
that the plaintiff is part of a class entitled to Title IX protection.120 At the time of
the decision, the court noted that the relevant federal case law had only designated
much like a Rule (12)(b)(6) motion to dismiss. . . . The court must first set aside conclusory
allegations and second, it must consider whether the residual facts support a ‘reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)). Brown University asserted that Title IX protections are limited to studenton-student harassment when both students were enrolled at same school where harassment
occurred. See id. at 560.
115. See id. (explaining the University’s argument that Jane Doe did not receive any
educational benefit from Brown University that would entitle her to recovery).
116. See id. at 560–61 (utilizing the specific selection statutory language in Title IX, as
well as past precedent to expand the reach of Title IX, to bolster her argument).
117. See id. at 560 (explaining that Jane Doe’s argument for nonstudent protection under
Title IX hinges on Congress’s use of general word “person” rather than more specific word
“student” in written statutory text); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“No person in the United
States, shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . .”).
118. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (refusing to extend Title IX protections to
nonstudents).
119. See id. at 560 (listing requisite elements for private claim under Title IX in the First
Circuit, based on requisite elements as outlined in Davis). In the First Circuit, a private litigant
seeking a remedy under Title IX must demonstrate:
(1) that he or she was subject to ‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ sexual
harassment by a school peer, and (2) that the harassment caused the plaintiff to be
deprived of educational opportunities or benefits . . . (3) [the funding recipient] knew
of the harassment, (4) in its programs or activities and (5) it was deliberately
indifferent to the harassment such that its response (or lack thereof) is clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.
Id. (quoting Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2007)).
120. See id. at 560 (explaining that, as a threshold matter, Jane Doe must prove her
standing as member of class entitled to Title IX protection). It is important to note here that
several other Title IX cases in the First Circuit have required plaintiffs to establish their status
as students either at the outset of the claim or as an element to the claim. See, e.g., Porto, 488
F.3d at 72–73 (listing plaintiff’s status as a student as a requisite element to recover under Title
IX); Frazier v. Fairhaven, 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002) (requiring that plaintiff be a student
before pursuing a harassment claim).
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two categories of protected individuals: students and employees.121 Because the
specific question of whether nonstudents have standing to bring a private Title IX
claim was one of first impression, the court turned to the legislative intent,
statutory language, and ultimately its own interpretation of Title IX case law for
guidance.122
After reviewing both the statutory language and legislative history, the court
concluded that Congress intended private enforcement of Title IX against a
school to be a program-specific action.123 The court reasoned that before Cannon
made a private right under Title IX available, the statute’s primary enforcement
mechanism applied financial penalties to the program in violation of federal
standards, and not to the school in general.124 To further support its conclusion,
the court also looked to statements made by United States Senator Birch Bayh,
121. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 560 (listing various cases from the First Circuit and
Supreme Court involving only students and employees as plaintiffs). See generally Davis ex
rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (involving student-plaintiff
suing school for Title IX violation); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982)
(allowing employees to bring private right of action action against school under Title IX);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (involving plaintiff who was student-applicant
denied admission to university); Frazier, 276 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiff must be
student in order to initiate Title IX suit).
122. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (“[T]he Court turns back to the purpose of the
statute and its language—who did Congress intend to protect from discrimination in educational
programs based on gender; and who did it intend to punish; and to whom did the United States
Supreme Court intend to give a private right of action?”).
123. See id. (reasoning that available federal case law and legislative history supported
conclusion that Title IX is a “program-specific” remedy). The court borrowed the phrase
“program-specific” from Bell’s discussion of administrative sanctions for schools in violation
of Title IX. Compare id. (“The language of the statute, supported by legislative history, shows
that enforcing Title IX against a school was meant to be program-specific—that is, the financial
penalties were applied to the specific program where the violation occurred and not to the school
in general.”), with Bell, 456 U.S. at 536–37 (“It is not only Title IX’s funding termination
provision that is program-specific. . . Title IX’s legislative history corroborates its general
program-specificity.”). Under Title IX’s enforcement provision, the termination of federal
funds or denial of future grants is limited, so as to affect only the particular program found in
violation of Title IX. See Bell, 456 U.S. at 537 (finding the portion of Title IX authorizing the
issuance of financial penalties “program-specific”).
124. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (explaining that history of Title IX’s enforcement
and federal financial mechanism justify the preclusion of nonstudent private claims). The court
in Doe failed to expand upon what, exactly, it means when it claims that the enforcement of
Title IX was meant to be program specific. See id. The court pointed out that the original
function of the statute was to withhold federal funding from certain programs within an
educational institution if it violated Title IX. See id. But, as Justice Stevens discussed in
Cannon, Title IX was expanded to serve two underlying purposes: withholding of federal
financial endorsement from schools that engage in discriminatory practices; and providing
protection for individuals who were victims of such practices. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
For further discussion on Cannon, see supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. While
administrative sanctions and civil suits under Title IX are not completely unrelated remedies,
the Supreme Court has made clear that they are two distinct modes of enforcement under Title
IX that serve two separate purposes. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561. In this case, the court
declined to extend a private remedy to nonstudents in part because the administrative remedy
has historically targeted specific programs in which students were enrolled. See id. Apparently,
the District Court of Rhode Island cross-contaminated those purposes; it used the programspecific nature of Title IX administrative sanctions to undermine the implied availability of a
private remedy. See id.
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Jr., of Indiana, the primary author of Title IX, identifying the three kinds of
discrimination that the Act intended to target: (1) discrimination in admission to
an institution, (2) discrimination of available services or studies within an
institution post-admission, and (3) discrimination in employment within an
institution.125 Senator Bayh’s explanation of the Act’s purpose, as interpreted by
the court, indicated that Title IX protections have historically been limited to
admitted students and employees.126
Relying on Title IX’s statutory language, the court further refuted Doe’s
attempt to expand the class of persons entitled to protections under Title IX.127
The court conceded that in Bell, the Supreme Court placed significant emphasis
on the use of the word “person” instead of “student” in the phrasing of the Act.128
While the Court liberally construed the word “person” to include both students
and employees in Bell, the court in Doe distinguished Bell’s expansive
construction for two reasons.129 First, the court recognized that the controversy
in Bell was not over a private right of action under Title IX, but whether Title IX
prohibits education programs from engaging in discriminatory employment
practices.130 Second, in addition to noting the different central legal claims in
125. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (using Senator Bayh’s statements to support
proposition that Title IX intended to protect only admitted students) (citing Bell, 456 U.S. at
526 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972)). Senator Bayh outlined three different kinds of
discrimination he believed Title IX would address:
We are dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimination of
available services or studies within an institution once students are admitted and
discrimination in employment within an institution, as a member of a faculty, or
whatever.
Id. (citing Bell, 456 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
126. See id. (noting Senator Bayh’s explanation of Title IX states that Title IX intended
to only protect students admitted to offending institutions, save his mention of discrimination
against employees of those institutions).
127. See id. at 562–63 (refusing to adopt Jane Doe’s stance that word “person” used in
Title IX can be expanded to include non-student plaintiffs); see also supra notes 63–68 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the word “person” by the Supreme Court in Bell.
128. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (“The [Supreme] Court concluded that because
Title IX proscribes employment discrimination in schools, employees of those schools are
covered in ‘persons.’”); see also Bell, 456 U.S. at 520–21 (noting that “person” implies broad
directive, appears to include both students and employees). Additionally, the Court in Bell left
the door open to expand the scope of “person” even further, by stating that, “Under that
provision, employees, like other ‘persons,’ may not be ‘excluded from participation in,’ ‘denied
the benefits of,’ or ‘subjected to discrimination under’ education programs receiving federal
financial support.” Bell, 456 U.S. at 520. This quote, in particular, implies that the Court
considered the possibility of other persons beyond students and employees deserving protection
under Title IX, and that being admitted to or enrolled in a program is not a requisite
characteristic to belong to class of recovery. See id.
129. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562–63 (noting there was no question as to employees’
connection to educational institution in Bell, nor did Bell address validity of private right of
action by employees against educational institution under Title IX).
130. See id. (reasoning controversy at heart of Bell is incomparable to Doe controversy
over nonstudent standing in private suits under Title IX). The District Court of Rhode Island’s
primary basis for rejecting the Bell court’s reasoning in expanding the scope of the word
“person” was the incomparable natures of the cases. See id. Bell involved the validity of
Department of Education regulations that prohibited federally funded education programs from
discriminating on the basis of gender with respect to employment. See id.; Bell, 456 U.S. at
514 (describing issue of case, which centered on legality of regulations issued pursuant to Title
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each case, the court pointed out that the complaining employees in Bell actually
worked for the offending school and therefore had a direct relationship with the
institution, unlike the nonstudent-plaintiff in Doe.131
The court also looked to other federal case law that, while not directly on
point, adumbrated the proposition that Title IX is limited exclusively to students
attending the offending school.132 The most important of these case discussions
was the court’s interpretation of K.T.133 Notably, the District Court of Rhode
Island adopted the reasoning in the opinion issued by the Eastern District of
Missouri instead of the more recent holding published by the Eighth Circuit.134
Drawing parallels from the Eastern District’s classification of the plaintiff in K.T.
as a nonstudent, the District Court of Rhode Island focused on the fact that Doe
was not a student at Brown University.135 Therefore, the court reasoned, its
actions or omissions could not have prevented Doe from getting an education at
Providence College, where she was enrolled.136 Ultimately, the court found the
Eastern District of Missouri’s reasoning persuasive, and held that nonstudents
cannot suffer deprivations from programs or activities at a school they do not
attend.137 Therefore, according to the District of Rhode Island, nonstudents do
not have standing to bring private Title IX claims against those schools.138
IX’s protection from discriminatory practices by educational institutions). In Doe, the issue
was not the validity of regulatory guidance as grounds for withholding funds, rather, it was
whether the class of persons entitled to recovery under Title IX should be expanded to
nonstudents. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563.
131. See id. (noting that employees in Bell had stronger relationship with offending
institution than Jane Doe had with Brown University).
132. See id. at 561 (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis and the First Circuit’s
decision in Frazier as examples of student-centric Title IX litigation). In addition to noting that
Frazier required a plaintiff to allege status as a student, the Doe court quoted the Supreme Court
in Davis, and emphasized that the plaintiff’s status in Davis as a student implicated the
availability of a private Title IX claim to admitted students only: “If a funding recipient does
not engage in harassment directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate
indifference subjects its students to harassment.” See id. (quoting Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v.
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
133. For further discussion on the reasoning employed by the Eastern District Court of
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit in K.T., see supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text.
134. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562, n.7 (noting “The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal
recently upheld K.T. on the merits—however, that Court did not address whether Title IX
applied to a non-student at the school, but assumed it did in agreeing with the district court’s
analysis of the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim on the merits.”). For further clarification on
the Eighth Circuit’s arguendo approach to the question of nonstudent standing for Title IX
claims, see supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text.
135. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (adhering to Eastern District of Missouri’s logic in
determining that lack of relationship between Brown University and Doe was a dispositive
factor). Of particular importance in Doe was the Eastern District of Missouri’s finding that
“because a non-student does not suffer from a systemic effect on educational programs or
activities at a school she does not attend, she has no right of action against that school under
Title IX.” See id. (citing K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL
4243965 at *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016)).
136. See id. (finding that Brown University did not have control or influence over
educational programs in which Jane Doe was enrolled).
137. See id. at 564 (“[L]egal precedent allowing for a private right of action for damages
is limited to certain situations. The Court finds that Ms. Doe’s case is not
among those scenarios.”).
138. See id. at 563 (“[Jane Doe’s] federal claim under Title IX fails to state a claim for
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V. WHEN IT RAINS, IT POURS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DOE v. BROWN
UNIVERSITY
Despite the District Court of Rhode Island’s insistence that its holding in
Doe honored the statutory language and legislative intent of Title IX, there are
other possible interpretations of federal case law and legislative history that lead
to a different conclusion.139 The court’s decision has serious practical
repercussions by allowing schools to negligently investigate and adjudicate
sexual misconduct claims involving nonstudents—without being held judicially
accountable.140 Courts should abandon Doe’s blanket preclusion of nonstudentplaintiffs in Title IX actions and allow them to bring claims against educational
institutions.141 The implications of the Doe decision are not only inconsistent
with the overall intent of Title IX, but potentially jeopardizes the health and safety
of students and college communities.142
A. Updated Forecast: Revisiting Title IX’s History
When a private right of action under Title IX was first introduced in Cannon,
the Supreme Court stated that the creation of a private remedy served one of two
legislative purposes underlying the passage of Title IX: to provide individuals
effective protection against discriminatory practices.143 With this purpose in
mind, Doe’s denial of a private remedy to nonstudents is in direct contradiction
to the very justification used in Cannon to create a mechanism for relief under

which relief can be granted and therefore it is dismissed.”). The court noted that because Jane
Doe was never a student at Brown University, it was not possible for her to lose any benefits or
opportunities she never had access to in the first place. See id. at 562.
139. For further discussion of how, contrary to the District Court of Rhode Island’s
assertion, federal case law and congressional material can be interpreted to support Title IX
protections for nonstudent-plaintiffs, see infra notes 140–79 and accompanying text.
140. For further discussion of the implications of the Doe decision, see infra notes 143–
79 and accompanying text.
141. For further discussion of the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in K.T., see supra notes 85–
101 and accompanying text.
142. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 564 (“This is a difficult conclusion to reach in the face
of Ms. Doe’s arguments that Brown and other schools may act or continue to act with deliberate
indifference to sexual harassment and violence on its campus.”). In its concluding statements,
the District Court of Rhode Island acknowledged its holding in Doe may tacitly permit schools
to ignore Title IX complaints by nonstudents and allow those schools to escape accountability
when they do. See id. It is no great leap to assume that a rule which excuses less-than
deliberately indifferent administrative responses to Title IX complaints has health and safety
implications for students and nonstudents, alike. See id.
143. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 704 (1979) (claiming second reason
underlying passage of Title IX was to “provide individual citizens effective protection against
[discriminatory] practices.”). The Court noted that the introduction of a private right of action
under Title IX was necessary to accomplish its underlying statutory purpose. See id. at 703.
Furthermore, the Court stated that at the time Cannon was decided, the inclusion of a private
remedy under Title IX was also supported by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
See id. at 706. The agency took “the unequivocal position that the individual remedy will
provide effective assistance to achieving the statutory purposes.” Id. at 706–07. For further
discussion of Cannon and the underlying purposes of Title IX, see supra notes 55–62 and
accompanying text.
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Title IX.144 The District Court of Rhode Island, however, did not rely on the
legislative intent the Supreme Court articulated in Cannon, but instead engaged
in its own inquiry regarding Title IX’s legislative history, relying heavily on
select comments made by Senator Bayh.145
The court conceded that while past statements of a single senator can hardly
suffice to provide a comprehensive view of congressional intent, Senator Bayh’s
position as the sponsor and author of the statute carried considerable weight.146
The difficult reality is that Congress did not debate the scope of Title IX at any
length, thus, Senator Bayh’s comments on the topic carry a high degree of
significance.147 Still, upon further review of the Congressional Record, Senator
Bayh’s statements indicate that Congress envisioned Title IX as an expansive
remedy that would address extensive discrimination at educational institutions.148
Contrary to Doe’s assertions, Senator Bayh’s comments do not support the

144. Compare Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 564 (“This is a case containing very serious
allegations of student conduct on a college campus in Rhode Island. Nevertheless, laws put
into place to protect students from sexual discrimination in educational programs were not
meant to address all instances of sexual assault occurring in the college environment . . . legal
precedent allowing for a private right of action for damages is limited to certain situations.”),
with Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708 (“Since the Civil War, the Federal Government and the federal
courts have been the primary and powerful reliances in protecting citizens against [invidious]
discrimination [including that on the basis of sex].”) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme
Court in Cannon set forth a position that the federal court system acts as a barrier between
individuals and institutions who might subject them to discrimination. See id. In declining to
extend Title IX protection to victims of sex discrimination, merely because of their enrollment
status, the District Court of Rhode Island did not follow the custodial principle proffered by the
Supreme Court in Cannon. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 564 (finding Jane Doe’s complaint not
among scenarios where Title IX protection applies).
145. Compare Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561-62 (interpreting only statements made by
Senator Bayh during debate about Title IX’s passage and relying almost exclusively on Davis,
Gebser, and Bell cases), with Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694. (“Far from evidencing any purpose to
deny a private cause of action, the history of Title IX rather plainly indicates that Congress
intended to create such a remedy.”). In Cannon, the Court began its dive into the history of
Title IX by first noting that its statutory language was intentionally patterned after Title VI—
and that “the drafters of Title VI explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as
Title VI had been.” See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694–96. The similarities between these Title IX
and Title VI is, in part, what led the Court to introduce an implied right of action under Title
IX, as one existed under Title VI. See id. at 699–703. Finally, the Court discussed the
legislative intent behind Title IX by detailing statements made about the purposes of the act
during the Congressional debates surrounding its passage. See id. at 703–08.
146. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (identifying Senator Bayh as important source
because he was the primary author and sponsor of Title IX in Senate), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st
Cir. 2018). The District Court did not elaborate on why it gave significant weight to Senator
Bayh’s comments, other than to say, “Senator Bayh’s remarks, as those of the sponsor and
author of the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute’s
construction.” See id.
147. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694, n.16, 696, n.19; 701, n.30 (showing that Supreme
Court heavily relied on Senator Bayh’s comments in determining purposes behind Title IX).
148. See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (“[The Amendment] is broad, but basically it
closes loopholes in existing legislation. . . .”). Congress issued such expansive language
because, according to Senator Bayh, sex discrimination had reached into so many facets of
women’s lives that the only appropriate “antidote” to the problem was a comprehensive
amendment. See id. at 5804. (“It is difficult to indicate the full extent of discrimination against
women today.”).
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exclusion of persons from Title IX protection based on enrollment status.149 In
fact, on several occasions, Senator Bayh referred to Title IX in a manner that
implied its broad application: “[A] strong and comprehensive measure is needed
to provide women with solid legal protection from the persistent, pernicious
discrimination which is serving to perpetuate second-class citizenship in
America.”150 This statement is one of several instances in the Congressional
Record where Senator Bayh impresses the point that Title IX was intentionally
drafted with broad language so it could be construed liberally.151 This
pronouncement, and others made by Senator Bayh, demonstrate an intent to
protect all persons, particularly women but not exclusively students, from
educational institutions that employ harmful discriminatory practices.152

149. See id. at 5807 (“The amendment is designed to expand some of our basic civil
rights and labor laws to prohibit the discrimination against women which was been so
thoroughly documented.”). Importantly, though the proposed language of Title IX directs that
no “person” in the United States shall be subject to discrimination on the basis of sex, Senator
Bayh refers constantly to the plight of American “women” in 1970 who sought to advance their
educational and employment opportunities. See id. Though not explicitly, Senator Bayh
interpreted the term “person” as the functional equivalent of the term “woman.” See id. The
implicit meaning behind Senator Bayh’s use of the word “person” is particularly instructive in
the disagreement between Jane Doe and the District Court of Rhode Island over the
interpretation of the word “person.” See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562. Senator Bayh’s use of
the word person also reflects that the term’s intended class of claimants has changed over time.
Compare 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (demonstrating Senator Bayh’s use of the word
“women” to denote intended class persons entitled to Title IX protection), with Doe, 270 F.
Supp. 3d at 558 (setting forth Jane Doe’s belief that “person” should include “persons
experiencing gender discrimination who are not students or staff at the offending school.”). For
further discussion of the parties’ respective arguments regarding the interpretation of the word
“person” in the context of Title IX, see supra notes 114–31. When Cannon first introduced a
private right of action under Title IX, the Supreme Court neither stated nor implied that the right
to bring a claim hinged on plaintiff’s status as a student. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709. In fact,
the Court in Cannon introduced a private right of action to provide relief to a nonstudent who
was denied admission to an educational institution. See id. at 680. Admittedly, Cannon did not
contemplate Title IX’s modern applicability to sexual harassment and assault, and therefore is
not the controlling precedent for peer-harassment suits. See id. Still, the court’s statutory
interpretation of the purposes underlying Title IX is instructive. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d 559–
61 (citing Cannon in analysis of decision on four separate occasions). Furthermore, though the
Supreme Court emphasized the “program-specific nature of Title IX” in Bell, the Court still
noted that, “If we are to give Title IX the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep
as broad as its language.” See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982). This
language implies, as in Cannon, that Title IX and its statutory language, including the word
“person,” should be construed generally and without significant limitations. See generally id.
(advocating for a more inclusive interpretation of the word “person” in Title IX’s statutory
language).
150. See 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement by Senator Bayh).
151. See, e.g., id. at 5803, 5804, 5807, 5808 (providing several statements by Senator
Bayh during debate on Title IX’s passage, in which he advocated for comprehensive protection
against discrimination by educational institutions).
152. See id. at 5808 (concluding that impact of Title IX is meant to be far-reaching and
functional). In closing his presentation of Title IX to the Senate floor, Senator Bayh noted the
relevant legislative history and important social backdrop behind the drafting of the Act:
[The] simple, if unpleasant, truth is that we still do not have in law the essential
guarantees of equal opportunity in education for men and women. When I proposed
an amendment similar to this last August it was ruled ‘nongermane.’ Now I am
coming back to the Senate with this comprehensive approach . . . .
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As both the Supreme Court in Cannon and Senator Bayh’s comments
articulate, the overall purpose of Title IX is to deter gender-based discrimination
and create a nonhostile educational environment that offers opportunities and
benefits for all persons who come into contact with educational institutions.153 If
a nonstudent is denied the ability to seek a remedy against an institution that failed
to investigate, adjudicate, or report a sexually heinous incident, then Title IX
cannot accomplish the broad custodial objective Congress sought in its passage
of the Act.154 By precluding nonstudents from the class of persons able to recover
under Title IX in Doe, the District of Rhode Island failed to provide adequate
shelter from unjust and biased institutional procedures.155
Not only did the District Court of Rhode Island’s holding in Doe fail to
adhere to the integrity and purpose of Title IX, but in reaching that holding it also
failed to adequately apply the Supreme Court’s peer-harassment analysis
prescribed in Davis.156 Davis is undoubtedly the controlling precedent for
evaluating peer-harassment claims, but the District Court of Rhode Island
required Doe to allege her status as an enrolled student, an element not explicitly
articulated in Davis.157 In contrast to the District Court of Rhode Island’s
inconsistent judicial interpretation, the Eighth Circuit properly applied the test
from Davis in K.T.158 The court’s silence on nonstudent standing not only
Id.
153. See id. (stating protection against discrimination by educational institutions must
be extensive); see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (describing the second purpose of Title IX as,
“to provide individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory] practices.”); 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018) (establishing that no “person” be subject to discrimination on basis of
sex).
154. Cf. 118 CONG. REC. 5803–08 (expressing sentiments by Senator Bayh, in which he
stated Title IX could provide protection against widespread discrimination by educational
institutions, particularly for women).
155. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 564 (D.R.I. 2017) (denying Jane
Doe private method of recovery under Title IX and acknowledging her only recourse for Brown
University’s deliberate indifference was pending administrative complaint), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127
(1st Cir. 2018).
156. See id. at 560 (“The elements a plaintiff must prove assume that Ms. Doe meets the
most basic criteria of a Title IX claimant, that she is part of a class of persons entitled to Title
IX protection.”). The District Court of Rhode Island cited several cases that acknowledge only
students and employees as claimants. See id. In a string cite, the court identified Frazier, in
which the First Circuit held a plaintiff must allege that they are a student in order to proceed
with a private right of action under Title IX. See id. (citing Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm.,
276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002)). There exists tension, then, not only between the First Circuit
and the Supreme Court’s requisite elements for peer-harassment claims, but also within the First
Circuit itself. See id. at 561 (examining Title IX plaintiff’s enrollment status as threshold matter
related to standing). But see Frazier, 276 F.3d at 66 (incorporating Title IX plaintiff’s
enrollment status as element of Davis test). The District Court of Rhode Island treated the
problem of Doe’s nonstudent status as a threshold issue rather than evaluating the merits of
Doe’s claim. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561.
157. See id. (explaining that inferences from federal case law, particularly Davis, support
limiting peer-harassment claims to students only). In Davis, the Court never explicitly required
a plaintiff to be a student in order to bring a Title IX claim, but the District Court of Rhode
Island reasoned that the Supreme Court’s continuous reference back to the school’s own
students highlighted its intention to apply a private right of action under Title IX only to
students. See id.
158. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (8th Cir. 2017)
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followed precedent but also contemplated the underlying purpose of a private
Title IX action.159
B. Tornado Warning: The Dangers of Doe v. Brown University
The K.T. court’s application of Davis to a nonstudent Title IX claim reflects
more than mere compliance with federal precedent.160 The legislative history and
judicial interpretation of Title IX discussed in this Note demonstrates that the
purpose of providing a private right of action under Title IX is to protect
individuals from an educational institution’s discriminatory practices.161 The
Eighth Circuit did not address whether nonstudents have standing to recover
under Title IX, leaving a sliver of hope for nonstudent-plaintiffs who seek to bring
claims.162 The unfortunate reality, however, is that even if nonstudents did have
standing, the high standard of the Davis test makes it incredibly difficult for a
nonstudent-plaintiff to prove the requisite elements successfully.163 Still, K.T.’s
refusal to definitively settle on the issue of nonstudent standing leaves open a
window, albeit a narrow one, of recovery for nonstudent-plaintiffs.164
The blanket preclusion in Doe blindly removes a private remedy under Title
IX from nonstudent-plaintiffs, regardless of any distinguishing facts that might
sustain a peer-harassment claim; it wields Davis against nonstudents like a blunt
instrument.165 The Eighth Circuit approached the claim in K.T. by holding that
(applying Davis to K.T.’s Title IX claim).
159. See generally id. (demonstrating that evaluating nonstudent’s peer-harassment
claim expands Title IX protection). As stated repeatedly in this Note, a private right of action
was implied by the text of Title IX to carry out the purpose of protecting individuals from
discriminatory practices. For a discussion of the legislative purposes identified in Cannon and
comments made by Senator Bayh regarding the expensive application of Title IX, see supra
notes 55–62, 143–55 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of how the Eighth Circuit’s holding in K.T. implicates an expansion
of the class of persons able to bring private claims under Title IX for peer harassment see infra
notes 162–73 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of the protective, custodial purpose behind the allowance of private
Title IX remedies, see supra notes 139–59 and accompanying text.
162. See K.T., 865 F.3d at 1056–57 (deciding to ignore the question of nonstudentplaintiff standing). It is important to note that the Eighth Circuit was fully aware of the legal
reasoning previously employed in K.T. by the Eastern District of Missouri. See id. The Eighth
Circuit very well could have agreed with the Eastern District and concluded that a nonstudent
cannot, as a matter of law, bring a Title IX claim against an educational institution they do not
attend. See id. at 1056. Instead of precluding all nonstudents from bringing Title IX claims at
the outset, the Eighth Circuit made a conscious decision to review the plaintiff’s complaint on
the merits. See id. at 1057. The court ultimately found that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to
state a claim of peer harassment under Title IX, but it never revisited the issue of nonstudent
standing. See id. at 1059.
163. For a discussion on how the plaintiff in K.T. lost her peer-harassment claim under
Title IX on the merits, see supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the
high standard established by the Supreme Court in Davis, see supra notes 69–84.
164. See infra notes 166–71 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the Eighth
Circuit’s holding in K.T. may permit recovery for nonstudents.
165. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 564 (D.R.I. 2017) (issuing a general
preclusion of nonstudent Title IX claims), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018). Instead of noting
Title IX’s historically expansive application and judicial interpretation, the District Court of
Rhode Island decided to issue a blanket denial of recourse to nonstudents under Title IX:
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the nonstudent-plaintiff did not satisfy an element of the Davis test, rather than
deciding on the issue of nonstudent standing.166 The school had no prior basis
for anticipating the sexual harassment, and because a school’s deliberate
indifference to actual knowledge of discrimination is necessary to bring a claim,
the suit could not stand.167 Although the Eighth Circuit chose to avoid the
question of nonstudent standing in K.T., the case is an example of how
nonstudents could possibly bring a claim if they are allowed to demonstrate the
standards proffered by Davis.168
For instance, if a student with a record of sexual misconduct assaulted a
nonstudent, and the nonstudent could show that the educational institution had
prior knowledge of that student’s conduct and failed to address the allegations in
a manner that could have prevented a future assault, then the nonstudent could
potentially establish the actual knowledge and deliberate indifference elements
under Davis.169 Even in these limited circumstances, nonstudents would struggle
to recover because of the difficulty in demonstrating the final element: the
misconduct was so pervasive, severe, and offensive that it substantially affected
their ability to receive an education at an institution they do not attend.170 So, had
“[L]aws put into place to protect students from sexual discrimination in educational programs
were not meant to address all instances of sexual assault occurring in the college environment.”
Id. For a further discussion of the District Court of Rhode Island’s reasoning and holding in
Doe, see supra notes 119–38 and accompanying text.
166. See K.T., 865 F.3d at 1057. (avoiding question of nonstudent-plaintiff standing in
Title IX cases instead addressing question of whether K.T. stated plausible claim for violation
of Title IX).
167. See id. at 1057–58 (noting that school’s deliberate indifference must subject
students to alleged suffered harassment, of which school must have had actual knowledge, in
order for claim to stand).
168. Cf. id. (engaging in Davis peer-harassment analysis). Because the Eighth Circuit
chose to address the plaintiff’s claims on the merits rather than preclude her from bringing a
claim based solely upon her nonstudent status, it is still possible that a nonstudent may plead
the requisite elements of a peer-harassment claim in the Eighth Circuit and potentially recover
from an educational institution. Cf. id.
169. For a discussion of the elements and practical application of the Davis decision, see
supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. Nonstudents would likely be able to recover only
if the student who harassed them was a known and recorded serial harasser. See K.T., 865 F.3d
at 1058 (noting that harassment committed by the same perpetrator can establish actual
knowledge). Such knowledge might only exist when the student has been reported to the school
by other survivors, establishing a sufficient record of offensive conduct to demonstrate actual
before-the-fact knowledge of the discriminatory conduct. See id. at 1059 (“K.T.’s complaint is
limited to an allegation of a single sexual assault. . . K.T.’s singular grievance on its own does
not plausibly allege pervasive discrimination as required to state a peer harassment claim.”);
see also Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (suggesting actual knowledge
can be established by recipient’s prior knowledge of (1) harassment committed by same
offending student or (2) previous reports of sexual harassment occurring on the same premises).
170. See Walker supra note 2, at 110 (noting difficulty of holding institutions liable in
light of requirement that alleged harassment was “severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive”). Walker also noted that lower courts have routinely disposed of Title IX suits on
the ground that the alleged harassment did not amount to the high standard articulated in Davis,
and that in general, Title IX claims rarely survive the pre-trial motion stage of litigation. See
id. at 127–28. The Davis test practically “immunizes” schools from liability in Title IX suits,
and seriously cripples the possibility for successful non-student complaints, even more so than
it already cripples enrolled student complaints. See id. at 99. Nevertheless, the high burden
may stymie criticism by those who think allowing nonstudents to bring suit under Title IX

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2020], Art. 1

30

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

[Vol. 64: p. 1

the court in Doe avoided the issue of nonstudent standing like the court in K.T.,
the extent of Title IX’s shelter still would have been minimal.171
Nonetheless, allowing nonstudents to bring suit under Title IX better honors
and reflects the underlying purpose of the Act rather than a blanket preclusion of
nonstudent-plaintiff claims, like the one issued in Doe.172 Under Doe, even if a
nonstudent could prove the requisite elements of the Davis test, a nonstudent
could not bring a Title IX claim in the District Court of Rhode Island.173 This
holding gives colleges and universities both leash and license to negligently
investigate claims, as well as leniently discipline their students when they assault
nonstudents.174 Because there is no looming threat of private suit, there is little
incentive for schools to remedy their Title IX response procedures for
nonstudents.175
Without a federal mandate to respond to nonstudent assaults, schools
would expose colleges and universities to unprecedented liability. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton
Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 4243965 at *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016) (arguing that
expansion of plaintiff class would impermissibly expand the scope of Title IX). This is also
where the unique facts of Doe are instructive, and the highly interconnected nature of American
universities becomes relevant. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 558–59 (arguing alleged sexual
assault caused plaintiff to drop out because of close proximity of Providence College and Brown
University). For a discussion of how colleges and nonstudent communities are both related and
intertwined see supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text. Doe argued that because the schools
were located in close proximity, she reasonably feared for her safety in the surrounding area
after Brown failed to discipline her alleged attackers; this fear resulted in a hostile educational
environment at her nearby school, Providence College. See Doe, 270 F. Supp 3d at 558–59.
Although a discussion advocating for the expansion of the Davis test—specifically, the
expansion of the “objectively offensive conduct” prong—is outside the scope of this Note,
future judicial interpretation might consider expanding Title IX’s reach to protect where the
substantial effects of harassment are felt, not just where the harassment occurred. See, e.g., id.
(acknowledging Jane Doe’s education was affected, but that education was provided by
Providence College, not Brown University).
171. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. at 564. (acknowledging at end of Doe opinion that
ramifications of decision would allow schools to act, or continue to act, with deliberate
indifference to reports of sexual misconduct committed against nonstudents). Still, despite the
dangerous implications of the Doe decision on nonstudents, it would be difficult for nonstudents
to show that they were deprived of an educational program they had no access to in the first
instance. See, e.g., K.T., 865 F.3d at 1059 (stating single incident of sexual misconduct could
not have had “systemic effect” on K.T.’s education at school she did not attend).
172. Compare id. at 1057 (overlooking issue of nonstudent standing for Title IX claims,
thereby leaving open possibility for nonstudent to bring claim according to Davis test), with
Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (categorically excluding nonstudents from private right of action
under Title IX, even if allegations of noncompliance are accepted by court as true).
173. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (deciding court need go no further in analysis of
Title IX claim if plaintiff is nonstudent).
174. See id. at 558 (“In 2016, after Ms. Doe’s repeated inquiries with appropriate persons
at Brown, Brown informed her that it never completed the inquiry concerning her assault an
abandoned any disciplinary action against the three Brown students.”).
175. See id. at 564 (pointing out OCR complaint filed by Doe still pending at time of
suit, which could force Brown University to face penalties). The District Court of Rhode Island,
in denying Doe’s private Title IX claim, also pointed out that an administrative remedy still
exists: “Title IX is an administrative enforcement statute and contains directives to ensure that
schools comply with its mandate against discrimination in education through funding
restrictions.” Id. For a further discussion of why Title IX plaintiffs prefer bringing private
actions rather than relying on administrative remedies, see supra notes 49–62 and
accompanying text.
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endanger the safety of campus visitors as well as other enrolled students.176 If
nonstudents lack a private method of accountability to pressure educational
institutions to investigate these claims under Title IX, predatory students may be
permitted to continue their behavior against nonstudents without discipline.177
Nonstudents should have standing to bring a claim under Title IX to more
effectively protect against discriminatory behavior perpetrated by both students
and educational institutions.178 If confronted with similar facts to those in Doe
and K.T., courts should allow nonstudent-plaintiffs to demonstrate—and
satisfy—the elements required by Davis, rather than issuing a blanket
preclusion.179
VI. THE SUN WON’T COME OUT TOMORROW: THE IMPACT OF DOE v. BROWN
UNIVERSITY
Although the aftershocks of the Doe decision are currently limited to the
First Circuit, the practical consequences of this decision on student safety and
institutional responsibility should cause widespread concern.180 It is likely
federal courts across the United States will continue to encounter Title IX cases
with nonstudent-plaintiffs; the interconnected nature of college campuses and
current social climate almost guarantees it.181 Nonstudents are still vulnerable to
sexual assault and harassment from students at educational institutions even if
they are not enrolled at or employed by those institutions.182 If a school does not

176. For further discussion of the underlying purposes of Title IX, see supra notes 55–
62, 139–59 and accompanying text.
177. See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (explaining students who allegedly assaulted Jane
Doe did not face discipline, despite Jane Doe’s repeated efforts to pressure Brown University
to complete inquiry into sexual misconduct incident). As evidenced in the Doe case, Brown
University did not feel obligated to respond to a nonstudent Title IX complaint; a lack of private
enforcement meant there was no way for Jane Doe to ensure that the students who assaulted her
suffered consequences. See id. For a further discussion of Brown University’s refusal to take
action against Doe’s alleged attackers, see supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
178. For a critical analysis of K.T. and further discussion of how the Eight Circuit’s
refusal to outright deny standing to nonstudents implicitly allows nonstudents to bring private
Title IX suits, see supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text.
179. See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (allowing
private Title IX suit for nonstudents so long as Davis requirements are satisfied); see also supra
notes 160–78 and accompanying text for this Note’s advocacy for allowing standing for
nonstudents over the reasoning employed in Doe.
180. See Thacker, supra note 11, at 701 (noting that educational institutions have
custodial and tutelary powers); see also supra notes 13–19 for information regarding
nonstudents’ relation to colleges and universities, specifically the number of visitors on college
campuses, the public nature of higher education, and the effect of educational institutions on
surrounding communities.
181. For a comprehensive review of the current socio-political climate surrounding
recent uproar over high-profile sexual misconduct allegations see supra notes 2–12. For a
discussion of the uniquely public nature of American colleges and universities, and the
implications of permeable campus borders. see supra notes 13–19.
182. See, e.g., K.T., 865 F.3d at 1056 (addressing complaint brought by nonstudentplaintiff who was assaulted by enrolled student after visiting campus and attending party); Doe,
270 F. Supp. 3d at 563–64 (addressing complaint brought by nonstudent-plaintiff who was
assaulted by enrolled student on campus after meeting enrolled student at local bar).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2020], Art. 1

32

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

[Vol. 64: p. 1

administer proper Title IX procedures to a nonstudent sexual misconduct
complaint, under Doe there is no impending threat of legal recourse, and
therefore, little incentive for schools to amend their Title IX response protocol.183
An educational institution’s unwillingness to administer its Title IX policy to
nonstudents is particularly problematic given the severely underreported nature
of sexual offenses, especially on college campuses, where incidents of sexual
misconduct also occur in high concentration.184
Even if a nonstudent does step forward to report an incident to a school, a
school’s failure to respond to that report can have harmful ramifications on other
students or employees if the same offender later repeats sexual misconduct.185 A
lack of private enforcement for nonstudents means there is no way to ensure
educational institutions follow through with Title IX protocol, unless that
nonstudent files a complaint with OCR.186 In dismissing nonstudent Title IX
claims, educational institutions may very well generate the hostile educational
environments Title IX was intended to remedy.187 The current interpretation of
183. See Kelley Taylor, Evaluating the Varied Impacts of Title IX, INSIGHT INTO
DIVERSITY WEBSITE (July 5, 2016), https://www.insightintodiversity.com/evaluating-thevaried-impacts-of-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/H5TP-F7PJ] (“[S]ince Title IX was passed, no
school has lost federal funds due to a violation of the statute. . . federal funding has reportedly
been made conditional on institutions remedying identified problems through resolution
agreements with the OCR.”). As Taylor noted, of the two original enforcement mechanisms
under Title IX—OCR administrative complaints and private legal suits—the OCR method of
enforcement is feeble. See id. As a result, the only remaining method of accountability is to
bring a legal claim as a Title IX plaintiff. Cf. id.
184. See Fast Facts College Crime, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS
(NCES), https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=804 [https://perma.cc/2GBB-R8CQ] (last
visited May 4, 2019) (finding out of 27,500 on-campus criminal incidents reported to police
and security in 2015, 8,000 were forcible sex offenses.); Sexual Assault Statistics, NATIONAL
SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR. (NSVRC), https://www.nsvrc.org/statistics
[https://perma.cc/2896-HF29] (last visited May 4, 2019) (showing sexual assault is most
underreported crime, with approximately 63% of sexual assaults projected to be unreported).
Furthermore, the NSVRC estimated that more than 90% of sexual assaults on college campuses
go unreported. See Sexual Assault Statistics, supra.
185. See David Lasiak & Paul Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among
Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 73, 78 (2002) (finding out of 2,000 men that
were polled, 120 men self-reported acts constituting the legal definition of rape or attempted
rape, and 76 reported committing repeat rapes). As demonstrated by these statistics, it is not
uncommon for rapists to commit multiple offenses. See id. If schools do not investigate sexual
assault claims made by nonstudents, then it is possible repeat offenders may go uninvestigated,
undisciplined, and as a result, can offend again. See Sarah Silverhardt, Giving Serial Rapists a
Permanent
Mark
on
Campus,
JURIST
(Aug.
30,
2017,
12:54
PM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2017/08/sarah-silverhardt-college-campuses-serial-rapists/
[https://perma.cc/4DXD-HKAF] (“Under Title IX, two particular flaws significantly contribute
to the continuous serial rape problem.”). According to Silverhardt, the first flaw is “non-existent
information sharing [about known sexual offenders] between post-secondary campuses.” See
id. The second flaw is “the lenient punishment implemented by the schools for Title IX
violations. . . such as sensitivity training, book report assignments or probation from
extracurricular activities. . . The most severe punishment is expulsion, which is uncommon,
and at some schools, nonexistent.” See id.
186. For explanation of why an OCR complaint is an inadequate administrative remedy,
and the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision to introduced a private right of action
under Title IX in Cannon, see supra notes 46–62 and accompanying text.
187. See 118 CONG. REC. 5803–08 (1972) (describing severe degree of hostile sex
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the statute insulates a culture of complicity among people who have the power
and responsibility to protect the community—not just their own students or
employees.188 Aside from leaving visitors vulnerable to harassment and assault
on college campuses, Doe takes away the most powerful legal mode of recourse
a person has after they are sexually violated: Title IX.189

discrimination within educational institutions and need for comprehensive reform via passage
of Title IX). For discussion regarding the health and safety impacts in dismissing nonstudentplaintiff Title IX claims see supra notes 180–86.
188. See, e.g., Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 563–64 (D.R.I. 2017)
(explaining Brown University continually ignored Jane Doe’s inquiries into pending sexual
misconduct complaint at school, and once investigation was finally intiated, did not comply
with Title IX standards), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018); id. at 564 (conceding that holding
in present case would allow deliberately indifferent school administrators to escape
accountability by nonstudents).
189. See id. at 563–64 (dismissing Doe’s state law claims under Rhode Island Civil
Rights Act and Rhode Island Constitution). Title IX is a substantial federal resource for victims
of sex discrimination; it is codified within the 1972 Educational Amendment to the Civil Right
Acts and provides not only an administrative mode of recovery, but also an implied private
cause of action that can be invoked by individuals against massive educational institutions. See
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694–70 (1979) (explaining legislative history and legal
power of Title IX, in addition to emphasizing importance of offering private remedy so as to
effect Title IX’s statutory purpose).
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